The Arc Continues: Disdaining Langdell From Law Student to Law Professor

 Favorite Carrell at Duke Law From LWI: 

Lecturing Against Langdell at Wake Law:

Not forgetting how our own legal education was watered down by Christopher Columbus Langdell's silly obsession with redacted appellate cases and his silly claim that law practice taints law professors, more and more of us are determined to make a change. Langdell's nonsense also eclipsed the importance of good character, and hopefully more and more of us will speak out on this as well.

From SSRN:

Langdell and the Eclipse of Character

                                                                     Abstract

Christopher Columbus Langdell has not only damaged the study of law with his three follies: his legal formalism, his redacted appellate case method, and his notion that legal practice taints the professor of law. His three follies have also impaired character development critical for legal actors. This Article focuses on four such critical character traits and virtues impaired by Langdell: (i) imagination, (ii) empathy, (ii) balance, and (iv) integrity. Readers wishing to explore virtues beyond those addressed in this Article might note my earlier examination of the role of virtue in good legal analysis found here.

This Article also calls out potential character issues with two professor types inspired by Langdell: (v) the hazing professor who confuses intellectual rigor with intense discomfort and who uses the redacted appellate case method to inflict such discomfort at the expense of better pedagogy, and (vi) the professor without substantial practice experience who is substantially paid to teach what she has never practiced.

Agreeing with C.S. Pierce that the best argument is a cable rather than a chain, I end by weaving in a Langdell villanelle (from my Apology Box also shared on this Blog) to supplement the prose. I hope such a cable can help lift Langdell and his follies from legal education and the world.

This Article can be downloaded here.

Keywords: Langdell, law school reform, legal education reform, virtue, imagination, empathy, balance, integrity, hazing, experience, translation, formalism, character, concept, category, metaphor

Why Legal Writing Is "Doctrinal" and More Importantly Profound

It is high time that we end the disparate treatment of legal writing professors and the use of such disparaging labels as "non-doctrinal" for the profound and essential subject matters which they teach. It is also high time that we reject the absurd Langdellian notion that practice taints scholarship.  I discuss these points in more detail here.

The Inherent Inseparability of Doctrine & Skills

A quick screen shot of my brief bit in Linda Edwards' fantastic new book The Doctrine Skills Divide: Legal Education's Self-Inflicted Wound.  I think the title speaks for itself, and the book should be required reading for everyone interested in reforming legal education today.

Wake Forest Law Review Publishes "Revisiting Langdell: Legal Education Reform & The Lawyer's Craft"

The Wake Forest Law Review has published its 2015 Legal Education Reform Symposium volume entitled Revisiting Langdell: Legal Education Reform & The Lawyer's Craft.  The volume can be purchased here and I hope it will make a positive difference in legal education reform. 

My introductory article in the volume highlights longstanding, substantial damage Christopher Columbus Langdell has inflicted on law schools and legal education. Much of this damage stems from three of Langdell’s wrong and counterintuitive notions: (1) law is a science of principles and doctrines known with certainty and primarily traced through case law; (2) studying redacted appellate cases is “much the shortest and best, if not the only way” of learning such law; and (3) despite Langdell’s own roughly fifteen years of practice experience, practice experience taints one’s ability to teach law. I briefly highlight problems with, and harms resulting from, each of these wrong notions. Among other things, I briefly explore: (A) contradictions, oversights, and wrong assumptions in Langdell’s views; (B) how the very meanings of “theory” and “practice” reject Langdell; (C) how the necessary role of experience in meaning itself rejects Langdell; (D) parallels between Langdell and unworkable Cartesian dualism; and (E) how the necessary role of framing in the law rejects Langdell. I also briefly survey some remedies suggested by reason, experience, common sense, and modern cognitive psychology. These include rejecting the redacted appellate case method as a primary mode of instruction, recognizing the necessary fusion of theory and practice, recognizing the need for practice experience in law professors, recognizing the embodied nature of meaning and the resulting role of practice and simulation in good legal education, embracing the humanities (including classical rhetoric) in legal education, abandoning meaningless distinctions such as distinctions between “doctrinal” and “non-doctrinal” courses, and abandoning “caste” systems demeaning those with law practice experience and elevating those who lack such necessary experience.  My introduction can be found here.

Cognitive Emotion and the Law

Many wrongly believe that emotion plays little or no role in legal reasoning. Unfortunately, Langdell and his “scientific” case method encourage this error. A careful review of analysis in the real world, however, belies this common belief. Emotion can be cognitive and cognition can be emotional. Additionally, modern neuroscience underscores the “co-dependence” of reason and emotion. Thus, even if law were a certain science of appellate cases (which it is not), emotion could not be torn from such “science.”

As we reform legal education, we must recognize the role of cognitive emotion in law and legal analysis. If we fail to do this, we shortchange law schools, students, and the bar in grievous ways. We shortchange the very basics of true and best legal analysis. We shortchange at least half the universe of expression (the affective half). We shortchange the importance of watching and guarding the true interests of our clients, which interests are inextricably intertwined with affective experience. We shortchange the importance of motivation in law, life, and legal education. How can lawyers understand the motives of clients and other relevant parties without understanding the emotions that motivate them? How can lawyers hope to persuade judges, other advocates, or parties across the table in a transaction without grasping affective experience that motivates them? How can law professors fully engage students while ignoring affective experience that motivates students? Finally, we shortchange matters of life and death: emotions affect health and thus the very vigor of the bar.

Using insights from practice, modern neuroscience, and philosophy, I therefore explore emotion and other affective experience through a lawyer’s lens. In doing this, I reject claims that emotion and other affective experience are mere feeling (though I do not discount the importance of feeling). I also reject claims that emotion and other affective experience are necessarily irrational or beyond our control. Instead, such experience is often intentional and quite rational and controllable. After exploring law and affective experience at more “macro” levels, I consider three more specific examples of the interaction of law and emotion: (i) emotion, expression, and the first amendment, (ii) emotion in legal elements and exceptions, and (iii) emotion and lawyer mental health. To provide lawyers and legal scholars with a “one-source” overview of emotion and the law, I have also included an Appendix addressing a number of particular emotions.

The article can be found here.

Langdell Defends Langdell With A Villanelle (An Addition To "The Apology Box")

Though I've gone after Langdell several times in prose (Exercising Common Sense, Razing Langdell, and Days of Auld Langdell), I've not attempted it in verse till now.  The Villanelle seemed a good form and I felt he would speak of himself in the third person were he writing it.  Of course, even in the more polished form of a villanelle, I still disagree with Langdell's thoughts on casebooks, experienced teachers, law's nature, and more.  Law is not a certain science.  Law practice experience makes better, not worse law professors.  Theory is blind if separated from practice.  Practice is empty without theory.  Law schools are therefore elevated rather than "dumbed down" by teaching practice and theory both.  The hypocrisy of Langdell's practicing for fifteen years while saying practice taints is of course not lost on me either.  I couldn't bear including a photo of the man so I have instead substituted a page from his infamous contracts casebook.

From Days of Auld Langdell: Crisis and Reform in Modern Legal Education

Archive of Blog Originally Posted 4/25/14 in The Huffinton Post

Overview of Wake Forest Law Review Legal Education Reform Symposium

Wake Forest Law Review Symposium Overview:

“Revisiting Langdell: Legal Education Reform and the Lawyer’s Craft”

By: Steven Verez

On October 23^rd 2015, The Wake Forest Law Review held a symposium entitled:  “Revisiting Langdell: Legal Education Reform and the Lawyer’s Craft.”  Over 200 persons attended the event.  The symposium was hosted by Wake Forest University School of Law Professors Harold Lloyd, Associate Professor of Legal Analysis and Writing and Christine Coughlin, Director of Legal Analysis, Research & Writing.  A symposium edition published by the Wake Forest Law Review containing articles by most of the speakers will be available soon.  A brief overview of some of the speakers’ topics and discussions is set out below.